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Abstract: The link between economic theory and experimental data is much tighter than
is commonly supposed. Many presumed paradoxes arise because the theory is incorrectly
applied. We go through several examples, emphasizing the theory as seen by a theorist.
The main problem with the theory is that in some instances it lacks predictive power –
We highlight where this is the case and current theoretical work designed to remedy the
problem.
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1. Introduction
The  relationship  between  economic  theory  and  experimental  evidence  is
controversial.  One  could  easily  get  the  impression  from  reading  the  experimental
literature that economic theory has little or no significance for explaining experimental
results.  The  point  of  this  essay  is  that  this  is  a  tremendously  misleading  impression.
Economic theory makes strong predictions about many situations, and is generally quite
accurate  in  predicting  behavior  in  the  laboratory.  Most  familiar  situations  where  the
theory is thought to fail, the failure is to properly apply the theory, and not in the theory
failing to explain the evidence.
That  said,  economic  theory  still  needs  to  be  strengthened  to  deal  with
experimental data: the problem is that in too many applications the theory is correct only
in the sense that it has little to say about what will happen. Rather than speaking of
whether the theory is correct or incorrect, the relevant question turns out to be whether it
is useful or not useful. In many instances it is not useful. It may not be able to predict
precisely how players will play in unfamiliar situations.
4 It buries too much in individual
preferences without attempting to understand how individual preferences are related to
particular environments. This latter failing is especially true when it comes to preferences
involving  risk  and  time,  and  in  preferences  involving  interpersonal  comparisons  –
altruism, spite and fairness.
By  way  of  contrast,  in  many  circumstances  equilibrium  is  robust  to  modest
departures from assumptions about selfish and rational behavior. In these circumstances,
the simplest form of the theory – Nash equilibrium with selfish preferences – explains the
data quite well. As we shall explain – in this case predictions about aggregate behavior
are  quite  accurate.  Predictions  about  individual  behavior  are  better  explained  by  a
perturbed  form  of  Nash  equilibrium  –  now  widely  known  as  Quantal  Response
equilibrium.
                                                
4 The theory sometimes can still make a good prediction even when players are not familiar with the game
being played. See Colin Camerer  [2003] for examples.2
2. Equilibrium Theory That Works
The central theory of equilibrium in economics is that of Nash equilibrium. Let us
see  how  that  theory  works  in  a  reasonably  complex  voting  situation.  The  model  is
adapted from Palfrey and Rosenthal [1985]. There are N  voters divided into two groups,
supporters of candidate A and candidate B. The number of voters is odd and divisible by
three  and  can  take  on  the  values  {3,9,27,51}.  Unlike  Palfrey  and  Rosenthal  the  two
groups are not  equal in size, rather  group  B is larger than  group A.  In the landslide
treatment, there are twice as many members of B as of A. In the tossup treatment there is
one more voter in group B than in group A. The voters may either vote for their preferred
candidate or abstain, and the rule is simple majority. The members of the winning group
receive a common prize of 105, while those in the losing group receive 5. In case of a tie,
both groups receive 55. Voting is costly: the costs are private information and drawn
independently  and  randomly  on  the  interval  [0,55].    Players  are  told  the  rules  in  a
common setting, and they get to play 50 times.
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Computing  the  Nash  equilibrium  of  this  game  is  sufficiently  difficult  that  it
cannot be done by hand, nor is it possible to prove that there is a unique equilibrium.
However, the equilibrium can be computed numerically, and  grid searches show  that
there is only one equilibrium. The key to equilibrium is the probability of pivotal events:
the benefit of casting a vote depends on the probability of being pivotal in an election. A
good test of Nash equilibrium then is to compare the theoretical probability of a voter3
being pivotal – that is, of a close election, versus the empirical frequency observed in the
laboratory.  The  graph  above  from  Levine  and  Palfrey  [2007]  plots  the  theoretical
probability on the horizontal axis and the empirical frequency on the vertical axis. If the
theory worked perfectly, the points should align on the forty-five degree line. They do.
Despite the fact that both theoretically and from observing fifty data points it is no easy
matter to infer the probability of being pivotal – the theory works nearly perfectly.
It  deserves  emphasis  that  when  we  speak  of  “theory”  here  we  are  speaking
entirely of a theoretical computation. In finding the Nash equilibrium probabilities of
being pivotal no parameters are fit to the data: no estimation is done whatever. A pure
computation is compared to live data, and the fit is nearly perfect.
The other central theory in economics besides Nash equilibrium is the competitive
equilibrium of a market. In modern theory, this can be viewed as the Nash equilibrium of
a mechanism in which traders reveal preferences to a market that then determines the
equilibrium – with the exact details of the market clearing mechanism of no importance.
Experiments  on  competitive  equilibrium  –  generally  in  which  the  market  clearing
mechanism is a double-oral auction in real time – have been conducted many  times,
dating  back  at  least  to  the  work  of  Smith  [1962].  The  results  are  highly  robust:4
competitive equilibrium predicts the outcome of competitive market experiments with a
high  degree  of  accuracy,  with  experimental  markets  converging  quickly  to  the
competitive price. One typical picture is the history of bids in an experiment by Plott and
Smith [1978] showing the convergence to the competitive equilibrium at a price of 60.
Again  notice  that  the  competitive  price  of  60  is  computed  from  purely  theoretical
considerations – no parameters are fit to the data.
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This picture of data that nearly perfectly fits purely theoretical computations is
true for a wide variety of experiments and is very much at odds with the viewpoint that
experimental results somehow prove the theory wrong. Indeed the theory fits much better
than models that must be estimated in order to fit noisy field data.
3. Equilibrium Theory that Does Not Fail
Moving  past  theory  that  predicts  accurately  and  well,  there  are  a  set  of
experiments in which equilibrium – especially the refinement of subgame perfection –
apparently fails badly. One such example is the ultimatum bargaining game. Here one
player proposes a division of $10 in nickels, and the second player may either accept or
reject the proposal. If she accepts then the money is divided as agreed upon. If she rejects
the game ends and neither player receives any money. Subgame perfection predicts that
the second player should accept any positive amount, and so the first mover should get at
least $9.95. The table below with the data from Roth et al [1991] shows that this is
scarcely the case. Nobody offers less than $2.00 and most offers are for $5.00, which is
the usual amount that the first player earns. Superficially, it would be hard to imagine a5
greater rejection of a theory than this. Moreover, like competitive market games, these
results have been replicated many times under many conditions.
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Despite  appearances,  theory  is  consistent  with  these  results  –  it  is  the
misapplication of the theory that leads to the apparent anomaly. First, the computation of
the subgame equilibrium is based on the assumption that players are selfish – that they
care only about their own money income. This assumption – which has nothing to do
with equilibrium theory, but is merely an assertion about the nature of players’ utility
functions – is clearly rejected by the data. A selfish player would not reject a positive
offer – this fact is the basis for calculating the subgame perfect equilibrium. However, the
data clearly shows that five out of twenty-seven positive offers are rejected. The data –
not to speak of common sense – shows that many players find low offers offensive in the
sense that they prefer nothing at all to a small share of the pie. A “theory” based on the
assumption of selfish preferences will naturally fail to explain the data. However, there is
nothing in the logic of rationality, Nash equilibrium, or subgame perfection that requires
players to have selfish preferences.
It is true in the mainstream theory of competitive markets economists typically
assume that people are selfish. This is not because economists believe that people are
selfish – we doubt you could find a single economist who would assert that – but rather
because  in  competitive  markets  it  does  not  matter  whether  or  not  people  are  selfish
because  they  have  no  opportunity  to  engage  in  spiteful  or  altruistic  behavior.
Consequently  it  is  convenient  for  computational  purposes  to  model  people  in  those
environments as being selfish. That should not be taken to mean that this useful modeling
tool should be ported to other inappropriate environments, such as bargaining situations.
Surprisingly, even the theory of selfish preferences does not do so badly as a
cursory inspection of the data might indicate. Nash equilibrium – as opposed to subgame
perfection – allows any offer to be an equilibrium: it is always possible that any lower
offer than the one the first player makes might be rejected with probability one, while the
current offer is accepted. Nash equilibrium rules out two less obvious features of the data.
It rules out a heterogeneity of offers, and it rules out offers being rejected in equilibrium
(if  players  are  truly  selfish).  It  is  a  mistaken  view  of  the  theory  that  leads  to  the
conclusion that this is a large discrepancy. Any theory is an idealization. Players’ exact6
preferences, beliefs, and so forth are never going to be known exactly to the modeler. As
a result, the only meaningful theory of Nash equilibrium is Radner’s [1980] notion of
epsilon equilibrium. This requires only that no player loses more than epsilon compared
to the true optimum – which in practice can never be known by the players. The correct
test of the goodness of fit of Nash equilibrium in experimental data is not whether the
results look like a Nash equilibrium, but rather whether players’ losses (epsilon) are small
relative to what they might have had.
The correct calculation of the departure of the  facts from the theory, in other
words, is to determine how much money a player who had available the experimental
data could have earned, and compare it to how much that player actually earned. To the
extent this is a large amount of money, we conclude the theory fits poorly. To the extent
it is a small amount of money we conclude the theory fits well. This is regardless of
whether the data “appear like” a Nash equilibrium or not. The key point is that allowing a
small epsilon in certain games can result in a large change in equilibrium behavior. That
large change does not contradict the theory of equilibrium – it is predicted by the theory
of equilibrium.
For  the  ultimatum  game,  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1997]  calculated  the  losses
players suffered from playing less than optimal strategies given the true strategies of their
opponents. Out of the $10 on the table, players only lose on average about $1.00 per
game.
This  is  not  the  end  of  the  story  however.  Nash  equilibrium,  as  least  as  it  is
currently viewed, is supposed to be the equilibrium in which players understand their
environment, including how their opponents play. It is supposed to be the outcome of a
dynamic process of learning – indeed, it may accurately be described as a situation where
no  further  learning  is  possible.  This  is  important  in  the  games  in  which  the  theory
worked: in the voting experiment players played 50 times and so had a great deal of
experience.  Similarly,  in  the  double  oral  auctions  players  got  to  participate  in  many
auctions and equilibrium  occurs  only  after  they  acquire  experience.  In  the  ultimatum
game, players got to play only ten times. More important, in an extensive form game
where players are informed only of the outcomes and not their opponents’ strategies,
players would have to engage in expensive active learning to achieve a Nash equilibrium,
and without a great deal of repetition and patience, they have no incentive to do so. In7
ultimatum  bargaining  in  particular,  the  first  mover  can  only  conjecture  what  might
happen  if  she  demanded  more  –  in  ten  plays  there  is  relatively  little  incentive  or
opportunity  to  systematically  experiment  with  different  offers  to  see  which  will  be
rejected or accepted. If the game were played 100 times, for example, then it would make
sense to try demanding a lot to see if perhaps the opponent would be willing to accept
bad offers. In 10 repetitions such a learning strategy does not make sense.
A weaker theory than Nash equilibrium – but one more suitable to the ultimatum
bargaining environment – is that of self-confirming equilibrium introduced in Fudenberg
and  Levine  [1993].  This  asserts  that  players  optimize  given  correct  beliefs  about  the
equilibrium path, but does not require that they know correctly what happens off the
equilibrium path, as they do not necessarily observe that. This makes a difference when
computing  the  amount  of  money  players  “lose”  relative  to  the  true  optimum.  In
ultimatum bargaining as we observed the first movers cannot know what will happen if
they demanded more. So setting making a demand that is too low is not a “knowing”
error, in the sense that the player has no way to know whether it is an error or not. This
leads us to compute not just the losses made by a player relative to the true optimum, but
to compute how many of those losses are “knowing losses” meaning the player might
reasonably know that he is making a loss. Self-confirming equilibrium is a theory that
predicts that knowing losses should be low – but makes no prediction about unknowing
losses.
For  the  ultimatum  game,  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1997]  also  calculated  the
knowing losses. On average players lose only $0.33 per game, and this is due entirely to
second players turning down positive offers – which as we noted has nothing to do with
equilibrium  theory  at  all.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  impact  of  preferences  (the
spiteful play of the second players) versus that of learning (the mistaken offers of the first
players). Players on average lose $0.33 due to having preferences that are not selfish, and
they lose on average $0.67 due to the fact that they lack adequate opportunity to learn
about their opponents’ strategies. The losses due to the deviation of preferences from the
assumption of selfish behavior are considerably less than the losses due to incomplete
learning.
The message here is not that theory does well with ultimatum bargaining. Rather
the message is that theory is weak with respect to ultimatum bargaining – very little data8
in  this  game  could  be  inconsistent  with  the  theory.  Rather  by  applying  the  theory
inappropriately, the conclusion was reached that the theory is wrong, while the correct
conclusion is that the theory is not useful. Modern efforts in theory  are quite rightly
directed towards strengthening the theory – primarily by better modeling the endogenous
attitudes of players towards one another as in Levine [1998], Fehr and Schmidt [1999],
Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], or Gul and Pesendorfer [2004].
We  can  tell  a  similar  tale  of  poorly  applied  subgame  perfection  in  the  other
famous “rejection” of theory, the centipede game of McKelvey and Palfrey [1992].
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The extensive form of the game is shown above. There are two players, and each
may  take  80%  of  the  pot  or  pass,  with  the  pot  doubling  at  each  round.  Backwards
induction  says  to  drop  out  immediately.  In  fact,  as  the  empirical  frequencies  in  the
diagram  show,  only  8%  of  players  actually  do  that.  As  in  ultimatum  bargaining,  the
evidence seems to fly in the face of the theory. Again, a closer examination shows that
this is not the case.
In a sense, this centipede game is the opposite of ultimatum. In ultimatum the
apparent discrepancy with theory was driven by the fact that second movers are spiteful
in the sense of being willing to take a small loss to punish an ungenerous opponent. In
centipede the discrepancy is driven by altruism – by the willingness of a few players to
suffer a small loss to provide a substantial reward to a generous opponent. The crucial
empirical fact is that 18% of players will make a gift to their opponent in the final round.
Notice that it costs them only $1.60 to give a gift worth $5.60. These gifts change the
strategic nature of the game completely. With the presence of gift-givers, the true optimal
strategy for each player is to stay in as long as possible. If you are the first mover stay in
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and hope you get lucky in the final round. If you are the second mover and make it to the
final round, go ahead and grab then.
Most  of  the  losses  in  centipede  are  actually  suffered  by  players  (foolishly
misapplying subgame perfection?) who do not realize that they should stay in as long as
possible, and so drop out too soon. Overall losses were computed by  Fudenberg  and
Levine [1997] to be about $0.15 per player per game. However, if you drop out too soon,
you never discover that there were players giving money away at the end of the game, so
those losses are not knowing losses. The only knowing losses are the gifts by players in
the  final  round.  These  amount  to  only  $0.02  per  player  per  game.  Notice  that  as  in
ultimatum, failed learning is responsible for substantially greater losses than deviation in
preferences from the benchmark case of selfishness.
Another important effort is to try to capture the insight of epsilon equilibrium –
that when some players deviate a little from equilibrium play, this may greatly change the
incentives of other players – without losing the predictive power of Nash equilibrium.
The most important effort in that direction is what has become known from the work of
McKelvey  and  Palfrey  [1995]  as  quantal  response  equilibrium.  This  allows  for  the
explicit possibility that player make random  errors.  Specifically,  if  we  denote  by  the
utility that a player receives from her own pure strategy  i s  and opponents mixed strategy
i σ−  by  ( , ) i i i u s σ− , and let  0 i λ >  be a behavioral parameter, we define the propensity
with which different strategies are played by
( ) exp( ( , )) i i i i i i p s u s λ σ− = .
Quantal response theory then predicts that the mixed strategies that will be employed are
given by normalizing the propensities to add to one
' ( ) ( )/ ( ')
i i i i i i i s s p s p s σ = ∑ .
This  theory,  like  Nash  equilibrium,  makes  strong  predictions.  As  i λ → ∞,  these
predictions in fact converge to those of Nash equilibrium. One important strength of this
theory  is  that  it  allows  for  substantial  heterogeneity  at  the  individual  level.  This  is
important, because experimental data is quite noisy, and individual behavior generally
heterogeneous.
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A good example of this is in the Levine and Palfrey [2007] voting experiment
described in the first section. The aggregate fit of the theory was very good, but at the
individual  level,  the  theory  fits  poorly.  Figure  4  taken  from  that  paper  shows  the
empirical  probability  with  which  a  voter  participates  as  a  function  of  the  loss  from
participating.  If  the  loss  is  positive,  Nash  equilibrium  predicts  the  probability  of
participation should be zero; if it is negative, the probability of participation should be
one, and the data should align itself accordingly. The individual data in the form of red
crosses and the aggregated data in the form of blue lines show that this is by no means
true.  When  losses  and  gains  are  small,  the  probability  of  participation  is  relatively
random  –  near  50%.  As  the  loss  from  participating  increases,  the  probability  of
participating decreases – but it hardly jumps from 1 to 0 as the threshold of indifference
is crossed. However, the gradual decline seen in the data is exactly what is predicted by
quantal  response  equilibrium.  Quantal  response  predicts  that  when  players  are  near
indifferent they effectively randomize. As incentives become stronger they play more
optimally.  The  green  line  shows  the  best  fit  quantal  response  function  where  i λ   is
estimated from the data. As can be seen, it fits the individual level data quite well.
A key idea here is that in the aggregate quantal response equilibrium may or may
not be sensitive to values of  i λ  that are only moderately large. In some games, such as11
the voting game, it makes little difference to aggregate behavior what  i λ  is, since some
voters  over-voting  makes  it  optimal  for  other  voters  to  under-vote.  Similarly  in  the
market games, individual errors do not matter much at the aggregate level. The important
thing is that we can always compute the quantal response equilibrium and determine how
sensitive the equilibrium is to changes in  i λ .
A good illustration of the strength – and potential weakness – of quantal response
equilibrium is the mixed strategy example of the asymmetric matching pennies game,
described in Goeree and Holt [2001].
5 It is a simple  2 2 ´  simultaneous game where the
row player chooses between Top and Bottom and the column player chooses between Left
and Right. The payoff is (40,80) when the outcome is (Top, Right) or (Bottom, Left), and
(80,40) when the outcome is (Bottom, Right). It would be symmetric if the payoff for the
outcome (Top, Left) was (80,40), but here we are  interested  in  the  asymmetric  cases
where the payoff for (Top, Left) is (320,40) in one case (denoted “the (320,40) case”) and
(44,40) in the other (denoted “the (44,40) case”). The data in Goeree and Holt [2001]
shows in the lab 96% of row players play Top and 16% of column players play Left in the
(320, 40) case, with the fraction numbers 8% and 80% respectively for the (44, 40) case.
It  is  obvious  that  these  lab  results  are  quite  different  from  what  the  theory  of  Nash
equilibrium predicts, where the fraction of row players playing Top should be 50% in
both cases.
If we apply the theory of quantal response equilibrium to this mixed
strategy example, the prediction power can be improved by a large degree. We do the
calculations  using  each  of  the  two  alternative  assumptions
6:  (1)  the  standard  selfish
preference  assumption  ( i i U u = )  and  (2)  the  more  realistic  altruistic  preference
assumption  ( (1 ) i i i U u u a a - = + - ,  where  [0,1) a Î ).  In  Figure  5,  the  horizontal  axis
represents the fraction of row players who play Top and the vertical axis represents the
fraction of column players who play Left. Both Nash and quantal response equilibria are
shown:  the  original  equilibrium  corresponding  to  the  selfish  case  and  the  “new”
equilibrium  corresponding  to  altruistic  preference  with  parameter  0.91 a = are  shown.
                                                
5 Note however that players only got to play once, so no learning was possible.
6 We also did the calculation by assuming (1 ) β −  fraction of people have altruistic preference and the rest
(0,1) β ∈  fraction of people are selfish, but the result is  not improved  much  from  the  case  in  which
0 β = , which is equivalent to assumption (2).12
The curves correspond to different quantal response equilibria with different values of λ.
Note  that  we  assume  that  since  players  are  drawn  from  the  same  population
1 2 λ λ λ = = .
By allowing players to make mistakes, as we can see from the graph, the theory of
quantal response equilibrium gives a better prediction than Nash equilibrium does. This is
especially true in the (320, 40) case with altruistic preference assumption– when  20 l = ,
the quantal response equilibrium is quite close to what the experimental data says. It is
also worth noting from the graph that the improvement in results from applying quantal
response equilibrium alone (for example, in the (320,40) case, equilibrium shifted from
(0.5,0.13)  to  (0.82,0.22))  is  more  than  the  improvement  from  assuming  altruistic
preference alone (respectively, equilibrium shifted from (0.50,0.13) to (0.75,0.12)). What
remains mysterious is the (44, 40) case, where the lab result is poorly explained either by
allowing people to make mistakes or by the preference of altruism.
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We can also analyze  ε equilibrium in this game. Under the selfish preference
assumption, the laboratory data corresponds to an  ε value of $0.07 per player per game
for the (44,40) case and $0.06 for the (320,40) case. The  ε values are $0.05 and $0.0213
respectively under the altruistic preference assumption. In  the (44,40) case the  set  of
possible equilibria is quite large: pretty much any mixture in which the fraction of row
players playing Top is less than 50% and fraction of column players who play Left is
greater than 50% is an ε equilibrium. In this sense it is not surprising that the lab result is
far  off  the  prediction  of  the  selfish-rational  theory.  What  is  interesting  is  that  the
perturbations  to  payoffs  that  explain  the  laboratory  result  are  due  neither  to  errors
(quantal response) or altruism.
In the case of the (320,40) case, the set of ε equilibrium is not so large. It predicts
little about the row players’ play – just that the row player should play Top more than
50% of the time. This must be the case, as the Nash equilibrium requires 50% play Top,
and in the laboratory result 96% play Top, and of course both of these must lie in the  ε
equilibrium set. Notice, however, that the play of the column player is predicted with a
relatively high degree of precision: it lies in the range of 10-22%.
4. What Experiments Have Taught Us
Experimental  economics  has  certainly  taught  us  where  the  theory  needs
strengthening  –  as  well  as  settling  some  long-standing  methodological  issues.  For
example, the issue of “why should we expect Nash equilibrium” has always had two
answers. One answer is that players introspectively imagine that they are in the shoes of
the other player, and reason their way to Nash equilibrium. This theory has conceptual
problems, especially when there are multiple equilibria. It also has computational issues –
for example there is a great deal of evidence that the game in which commuters choose
routes  to  work  during  rush  hour  is  in  equilibrium  although  individual  commuters
certainly  do  not  compute  solutions  to  the  game.  Never-the-less  in  principle,  players
might, at least in simpler games, employ a procedure such as the Harsanyi and Selten
[1988]  tracing  procedure.  Experimental  evidence,  however,  decisively  rejects  the
hypothesis that the first time players are exposed to a game they manage to play a Nash
equilibrium. As a result the current view – for example in Fudenberg and Levine [1998] –
is that if equilibrium is reached, it is through learning. For example, the rush hour traffic
game is known from the work of Monderer and Shapley [1996] to be a potential game,
and such games have been shown, for example by Sandholm [2001], to be stable under a
wide variety of learning procedures.14
As Nash equilibrium cannot predict the outcome of one-off games, one area of
theoretical research is to investigate models that can. The most promising models are the
type models of Stahl and Wilson [1995]: here players are viewed as having different
levels  of  strategic  sophistication.  At  the  bottom  level,  players  play  randomly;  more
sophisticated player optimize against random opponents; even more sophisticated players
optimize  against  opponents  who  optimize  against  random  opponents,  and  so  forth.
Experimental  research,  for  example  by  Costa-Gomes  et  al  [2001],  shows  that  these
models can explain a great deal of first-time play, as well as the details of how players
reason. The greatest lacuna in this literature, is that it has not yet been well tied in to a
theory  of  learning:  we  have  a  reasonable  theory  of  first-time  play,  and  a  reasonable
theory of long-term play, but the in-between has not been solidly modeled.
The second area we highlighted above is the area of interpersonal preferences:
altruism and spite. As mentioned, there are a variety of models including Levine [1998],
Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], or Gul and Pesendorfer [2004],
that attack this problem, but there is not as yet a settled theory.
There  is  one  “emperor  has  no  clothes”  aspect  of  experimental  research.  This
involves  attitudes  towards  risk.  The  standard  model  of  game  theory  supposes  that
players’ preferences can be represented by a cardinal utility function. The deficiency in
this theory was highlighted by Rabin’s [2000] paradox
“Suppose we knew a risk-averse person turns down 50-50 lose $100/gain $105
bets for any lifetime wealth level less than $350,000, but knew nothing about the
degree of her risk aversion for wealth levels above $350,000. Then we know that
from an initial wealth level of $340,000 the person will turn down a 50-50 bet of
losing $4,000 and gaining $635,670.”
The point here is that in the laboratory players routinely turn down 50-50 lose $100/gain
$105 gambles, and even more favorable gambles. Yet this is not only inconsistent with
behavior in the large – it is off by (three!!) orders of magnitude. Roughly, the stakes in
the  laboratory  are  so  small,  that  any  reasonable  degree  of  risk  aversion  implies  risk
neutrality for laboratory stakes – something strongly contradicted by the available data.15
There are various possible theoretical fixes, ranging from the prospect theory of
Tversky  and  Kahneman  [1974]  to  the  dual  self  approach  of  Fudenberg  and  Levine
[2006], but it is fair to say that there is no settled theory, and that this is an ongoing
important area of research.
5. Conclusion
The  idea  that  experimental  economics  has  somehow  overturned  years  of
theoretical research is ludicrous. A good way to wrap up, perhaps, is with the famous
prisoner’s dilemma game. No game has been so much studied either theoretically or in
the laboratory. One might summarize the widespread view as: people cooperate in the
laboratory when the theory says they should not. Caveat emptor. The proper antidote to
that view can be found in the careful experiments of Dal Bo [2005]. The proper summary
of that paper is: standard Nash equilibrium theory of selfish players works quite well in
predicting the laboratory behavior of players in prisoner’s dilemma games.
What experimental economics has done very effectively is to highlight where the
theory is weak, and there has been an important feedback loop between improving the
theory – quantal response equilibrium being an outstanding example – and improving the
explanation of experimental facts.16
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